the theory of optimal growth and thus expanded the theory on externalities in a static environment as presented by the leading studies of Mishan [14] in 1971 and Baumol [2] in 1972. However, he assumed a constant labor supply and population size and thus ignored an important aspect of the impact of pollution on economic growth. In our work, the focus changes to incorporate changes in population and labor supply. Moreover, the household's decision concerning its size, which is now endogenous, will also be affected by the level of pollution. And, indeed, it thus follows that besides the known requirement of levying the Pigouvian taxes on the producers, the consumer has to pay an additional corrective tax proportional to household size.
An additional result of our model is that the appropriate rate of return for evaluation of public projects (e.g., a cost benefit analysis of a public investment project) is different from the market rate of return and is usually lower in a growing economy. We also investigate possible biases in the private and public rate of returns as well as in other economic parameters, due to nonoptimal policies. We do find additional biases to those mentioned by Brock concerning the market rate of return. We also identify different biases to the public rate of return. 3 The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the model assumptions are specified. In Section 3, the general equilibrium solution of the model is presented as an interaction of the consumer sector, producer sector, and government sector. In Section 4, the optimal solution, which provides the basis of the government behavior, is described. In Section 5, some characteristics of the solution are described, and in Section 6 the results are analyzed and a sensitivity analysis is carried out. The analysis is divided into 4 subsections. In Subsection 6.1, the market and public rates of returns are identified; in Subsection 6.2 we investigate the distortion in resource allocation in the presence of negative externalities and lack of appropriate government policy. In Subsection 6.3 we analyze distortions caused by the provision of less than the optimal amount of desirable public good or insufficient subsidization of households. We summarize the resulting biases and some policy implications in Subsection 6.4. We also develop a theory of aggregation of biases in economies with more than one public good and speculate about the estimation of those biases.
THE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Following Razin and Ben Zion [17] , we assume a household which derives welfare from C(t), the consumption of a composite good C at generation t, and from the welfare of the immediately following generation. Preferences are the same for each generation and can be represented by an additive utility function Vt= U(C(t))+,IVt+1 where ,B is the subjective factor by which the current generation discounts the utility of the next generation. As Razin and Ben Zion [17] shows4 this utility function leads to a household which acts as if it maximizes the function 00 Vt= E fTU(CQ()) rt or, in a continuous form,
Vt=
e TU(C(r)) dr, where 8 is the continuous counterpart of (1 -,8)/13. Now, let there be N(t) identical households at generation t, and let x (t) and p(t) be the production (per household) of a traded composite good and a public good (per household), respectively. The public good (PG) can be either an undesirable public good (UPG) or a desirable public good (DPG), depending on its contribution to the welfare of the households in the economy. The household's behavior in a generation to is derived as if it maximizes its utility VtO. Its decisions materialize only in the present generation, to, while in the next generation his offspring will make their own decisions. Thus, this particular household considers its size at each time t : to as n (t), where n (to) 1; i.e., at the initial state the household perceives itself as a unit, and the rate of increase in the family size, A, is given by (1) n (t) = An (t).
The decision making unit relevant at time t is the household at that given time, with family size assumed to be n (t) 1. But in its decision, the household takes into account what is expected to happen to the family in the future.
Adopting the Becker-Lancaster approach (see Michael and Becker [13] ), assume that in each generation the price-taking household derives its utility from the consumption of C(t), which depends on the following attributes: the quantity x (t) of market goods bought by the household, the total amount of PG (desirable or undesirable) p(t)N(t), the regeneration rate A (t), and the proportion of its time allocated to household activities r. Thus, we obtain5 s From this point on whenever possible we omit the independent variable t, for reasons of simplicity of exposition. Condition (2.1) implies positive marginal utilities from market goods, regeneration, and leisure, as well as positive marginal utility from DPG and negative marginal utility from UPG. Condition (2.2) implies that people will never reach a state of non-consumption of market goods, DPG, and leisure. The reason is that as the stock of any of these goods is depleted an additional unit of the good will contain more and more utility. This assumption is reasonable and acceptable, as well as realistic.
Condition (2.3) is a saturation condition on the PG. On the one hand, it states that the household cannot survive if the UPG level increases indefinitely, and on the other hand it states that the household cannot live on DPG alone. Condition (2.4) defines the range of the various variables. On the production side, a neoclassical production function is assumed, producing an output x per household which depends on the amount of capital stock per household, k, the time input by the household, 1-r, and the public good generated by the production process, p, measured per household. Hence, It should be noted that investment and market consumption goods are measured in the same units and produced by the same production process. x is the total of this composite good produced per household at time t. Condition (3.1) states that each of the production factors is essential for the production process and we cannot do completely without any of them. The same is true with respect to the UPG, but not so with respect to the DPG. Condition (3.2) defines marginal productivities of production factors and the marginal rate of transformation between the PG and the private good produced. Condition (3.3) states the neoclassical rule of saturation for the productivity of capital and for the marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public goods. When the PG increases indefinitely its marginal product tends to approach zero if p is UPG and to approach -00 if p is DPG. The first part of (3.4) relates the neoclassical production function conditions; the second part of (3.4) states the impossibility of producing the private good without producing some quantity of UPG, but it is possible to produce the private good without producing DPG, and in order to produce some DPG a certain quantity of private good has to be sacrificed.
The distinction between UPG and DPG requires further clarification. The PG is undesirable when it causes damage to the household by reducing the output of the household production, i.e., Z2 < 0. p is generated because its marginal productivity is positive in the production sector, i.e., f2> 0 and its damages are external to industry. fQ() in that case is a joint production function of p and x, where p is a negative product.6 A public good is desirable when the marginal productivity of the household production function Z2> 0, and the marginal opportunity cost f2< 0.
A typical example of a UPG is contamination of the environment by wastes or effluents generated by firms during the production process. The whole industry generates a total of Np units of pollutants which affect the population. In the case of a DPG, the signs are reversed, since the public good has a positive contribution to the utilities of the household. In this case, f represents the transformation function between the private good, x, and the collective good, p, e.g., the defense of the nation. In both cases the market mechanism fails to operate and the government may have to use policy instruments-taxes or subsidies-to be levied on households by the amount of ,u (t) per unit of household size n (t) and on firms q (t) per unit of PG in order to achieve efficiency. The total amount of taxes (subsidies) collected (distributed) is then distributed (collected) to (from) the households as a lump sum. The lump sum is equally divided between the households independently of the household size.
The household's total income at time t is: w + rk + g, where w is the wage rate, r is the rate of capital rent, k is the amount of capital owned by the household, and g is total government transfer of income per household (positive or negative). The household spends its income on regeneration, A, whose cost is k (we assume that capital is equally divided between household members, and that those leaving the household take their share with them); on the ratio of time spent in household production and leisure, r, evaluated by its shadow price w; on market consumption goods, x; on tax per unit of household size, ,u; and on savings k, measured in units of market goods. Accordingly the following equation of motion holds:
The distinction between myopic and non-myopic decision rules in optimal capital policies depends on whether or not investment is reversible (see Arrow [1] ). In this study the focus is on regeneration in the context of economic growth and hence the time periods are in units of generations. Thus, the irreversible decisions are made by the household according to its capital (k) and size (n). The decisions made by the firm are short-term in nature and concern the amount of capital services rented from the households and, therefore, are reversible and result in myopic decision rules. Accordingly, the industry acts as a myopic decision maker and its profit function per capita is:
where cr is the rate of capital depreciation and 71 is the price of p paid by the industry (positive if UPG, negative if DPG) and set by the government. It should be noted that N is not a decision variable controlled by the industry. Thus, maximizing R/N is equivalent to maximizing R.
THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
We are now prepared to consider the following general equilibrium problem with externalities:
(A) The representative household problem at time to is to maximize 
U'Z3-kel+62n(t) = 0, In the following sections we will prove that 2 is negative if y is positive, i.e., if p is a UPG, and that 42 is positive if y is negative, i.e., if p is a DPG. When ,u vanishes so does 62 and {2 and equation (15) reduces to the simple demand function for regeneration described by Razin and Ben Zion [17] . In this last case, n (t) ceases to be a variable. Equations (9) and (10) Equation (18) describes the demand function for regeneration, where the price of regeneration is equal to k plus the present value of all the household's future payments of corrective taxes. It should be noted that the capitalization rate is equal to the subjective time preference 8, minus the regeneration rate minus the rate of change of the shadow price of population growth. It follows that there are two distinct discount rates: r(t), the capital investment rate, and p(t), defined in equation (19) , the capitalization rate of investment in family size: ( 
19) p (t) =8 -A (t)-,B (t).
Additionally, by solving ( The analysis carried out so far refers to a household at an arbitrary time, to. At time to, the size of the household is equal to unity and was determined at a time previous to to. The household decisions will be carried out only at time to. At any other time t, the decisions of the generation living at time t will be carried out, in accordance with the equations above. Therefore, the following relationships should be added to the above behavioral equations in order to represent the equilibrium conditions at any time t: rio, the tax levied on the producers, is the well known Pigouvian tax discussed, for example, in Baumol and in Brock in the dynamic case. In the case of a DPG, ro is negative and its absolute value is equal to the price per unit the government must pay to industry for producing p. ,uo is a per unit of household size tax payed by the population to the government in the case of a UPG and is a per unit of household size subsidy paid by the government to the population in the case of a DPG. This type of tax or subsidy is new and has not been discussed previously in the literature.
The rationale for taxing the household for a UPG it suffers from and subsidizing it for a DPG it derives benefits from is the following: The household, through regeneration, maintains its desired future size and as a result its future demand for future market goods. In the case of UPG the household demand for market goods creates a derived demand for UPG by industry. Thus, the UPG, when produced in the future, has a social cost which is external to the household when it contemplates regeneration.
By taxing population proportionally to size this external effect is internalized. When contemplating regeneration the household will take into account future costs to the household due to its current decision on regeneration. That is, the household will include the discounted value of all future taxes as part of the price of regeneration (see equation (18)). Actually current taxes do not have any influence on the household decisions, except in the sense that it serves as a predictor of the future taxes the household will have to bear.
In the case of a DPG, the subsidy encourages the household to increase its size, thus utilizing the public good p more effectively in the future and decreasing its cost per capita. Thus the subsidy actually compensates the household for increasing everybody's welfare in the future, by reducing costs of DPG in the future.
At any given time, the total tax (subsidy) collected from (paid to) industry, is equal to the total tax (subsidy) collected from (paid to) the household sector, and is equal to (-N2p(Z2/Z,)). The total optimal lump sum tax per household is equal to 
It follows that 42(t) < 0 for all t since, being an auxiliary variable, it cannot change sign. From (20) we obtain an upper limit to A (t), (39) A (t) -, 8-,B.
Moreover, p, the discount rate of family size, is now proved to be positive. The value of N(cc) depends on the particular functions Z, f, and U. We will therefore try to characterize the solution under the two alternatives.
(
d.1) N(cc)=oc. Under this condition, we define P(t)=N(t)p(t).
Thus, 0 < P(cc) = PF < cc, and p(cc) = 0. The expression e2/41 is the discounted value of all future subsidies to the household and is therefore positive. The implication is that, since 13 ( 
cc) = 0, 0 < A (cc) < 8 in the steady state, A (t) is limited, i.e., A (t) < -1, (t). This is also implied from the transversality condition. (d.2) N(oo) < cc. This immediately implies that A (cc) = 0. p(cc) > 0, and so is 42(oo) and 62. Again this implies A (t) < 8 -1(t).

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
In this section we will analyze the results of different types of deviation from the optimum and determine what kind of distortions in the optimum resource allocation result from each of them. We also look into any possible effects these deviations may have on decision parameters that may lead, in turn, to future deviations.
Market and Public Rate of Return
Before proceeding it should be recalled that the previous analysis contained two different discount rates: p (t) = 8 -(A (t) + /3(t)) and r(t) = 8 + (A (t) -a (t)). The public rate p(t) is the rate of return to government investments in public goods; r(t) is the rate of return to a household's investment in private markets. From the above we may deduce that (41) p(t) = r(t)-2A (t) + (a (t)-,B (t)).
The rationale for (41) lays in the fact that p(t) and r(t) relate to two different units of the population. When a household invests in the private market it expects the yield of this investment to enable the same household to consume goods in the future, which compensates for lost present consumption.
Since the household's size changes with time at rate A, the investment yield must be at a rate which compensates for 8, the household's time preference plus A. In addition, the change of a, the shadow price of capital in terms of utility units, has to be taken into account. The change stems from changes in the productivity of capital due mainly to changes in the capital to labor ratio, although changes in the pollution or public goods level or changes in the amount of time spent in the labor market could also affect this shadow price. Thus, the appropriate market rate of return is r(t) = 8 + A -a (t) where a (t) is the rate of change in the value of capital.
In the case of public investment the relevant household unit size does not change with time. Furthermore, since we are dealing in public goods, benefits from these goods change with changes in population size, increasing when population size increases and decreasing when population size decreases. Hence it follows that we may substitute between population size and quantity of public good. That is, in the future we would agree to a reduction in the amount of public good if there is an increase in population size. The rate of return would be the household's time preference minus the regeneration rate.
The change in shadow price of family size depends mainly on future taxes or subsidies the household expects to pay or get per unit household size. However, once the shadow price is different from zero, i.e., once the household expects future positive subsidies or positive taxes, other parameters may come into play. Since a change in the shadow price of household size affects our expectations from government investment in public goods, ,B must be included in that rate of capitalization of public investment; hence p (t) = 8-A -/3. Even in a world without pollution or public goods, p (t) would still be different from r(t). However, in such a world there would be no need for public investment.
The question of estimating r(t) and p(t) arises. Since r(t) is the market rate of return, it is readily available. By using (41) p(t) can be estimated if we know A, a, and ,1. The growth rate of the population, A (t), is, like r(t), readily available. The problem becomes one of estimating a (t) and 13(t). We would consider a (t) to be a significant parameter mainly in periods of rapid changes in the structure of the economy (periods of major technological changes, high population migration rates, major foreign capital investment, etc.). 1 (t) will be more sensitive to major changes in government policy towards the provision of public goods (desirable or not) and social programs (welfare programs, medicare, unemployment, etc.). However, beyond making an educated guess we have no idea how to estimate a -ai.
It is interesting to note that economists and policy makers have long felt the need for a different, usually lower, rate of return for public investment in an expanding economy. 8 
Distortions in the Case of UPGDue to Lack of Proper GovernmentIntervention
The following analysis deals only with the long run effects (steady state), unless stated otherwise. Consider the case of a UPG, say pollution. Brock shows that if the firms are not charged an q equal to the social cost of pollution, the observed equilibrium market rate of interest, re, is likely to be larger than the socially optimum interest rate, ro, and, at the same time, more capital will be accumulated at a faster rate. It is interesting to compare these results, where the supply of labor is assumed constant, to our model which introduces regeneration.
Let the per household tax tUe be smaller than the optimal value (or even equal to 0). In such a case Ae is greater than Ao (higher birth rate), and ke is smaller than ko (lower capital per household). This can be verified by substituting 2 = 0 in (17).
The fact that regeneration is "cheaper" than in the optimum (Ate < o) will lead to an increase in regeneration, in the supply of labor and in consumption of other goods. The increase in the consumption of x will result in an increase in pollution. On the other hand, leisure, r, which we assume to be a complement to pollution and a substitute to market goods, decreases. The intuitive reason is that you do not enjoy your leisure if the environment is polluted and you substitute cheaper market goods for it. This means that the supply of labor per household, 1-r, is increased along with the total number of labor force participants N(t). Similar effects will be obtained if ')e < N, where r1 is the tax per unit of pollution. Under such circumstances, pollution becomes cheaper at the laissez faire solution than at the optimum solution and is used excessively, thus increasing environmental pollution. Capital and labor become more productive, which increases the demand for them. The household then demands and uses less leisure and more market goods and regeneration to compensate for more pollution and for the increased demand for labor.
In summary, if either q or ,u are smaller than their optimal values, the following distortions appear while comparing the equilibrium based on the distorted pricing of pollution with the system supported by optimal taxation: Another interesting case is when jf,e > Iu.o. Recently, the federal government has been striving for a situation of zero pollution. This is equivalent to letting A,e approach infinity. We assume that 'qe <77O.
The increase in the cost of the UPG with respect to its optimum level tends to decrease the amount of UPG produced. This causes an initial reduction in both capital and labor productivity with respect to their optimal values. Since the price of regeneration is lower than the optimal price, Ae, the rate of regeneration at laissez faire equilibrium is greater than AO. Hence when the government tries to implement a new policy of no pollution, we will initially see a decrease in the market rate of return. Since Ae increases as well, we will see an increase in a, the rate of change of the shadow price of capital; this can be verified from (18). In the long run, however, a policy of zero pollution together with undertaxation of households will result in an increase in the rate of regeneration relative to the optimum. This in turn causes an increase in Ne, a decrease in ke, the capital per capita, and thus leads to a long run increase in re, the marginal productivity of capital, and to an even greater decrease of We, the marginal productivity of labor, in the long run relative to the short run. Therefore, we cannot determine the sign of the bias in re in this case. From (18) we see that in the long run r and A have a one to one correspondence. Thus we do not know the direction of the bias in A as well.
The rate of return to public investment p (t) is responsive in the long run to the same policies that r(t) is, but the effect is reversed. When r(t) increases, p(t) decreases and vice versa. This can be verified by comparing (18) with (20).
The Case of DPG-Distortions Due to Nonoptimal Government Policies
Here we focus on the long run bias. Let us first consider the effect of insufficient finance of the public good, i.e., 71e <71O. In this case more than the optimal quantities of market goods will be supplied and consumed. The regeneration rate will increase and leisure will decrease or show a smaller increase (since leisure is assumed to be a complement to the public good and a substitute to all other goods). It follows that capital per capita decreases and the equilibrium market rate of return increases relatively to the optimum. The rate of return of public investment p(t), however, is below its optimum level. All this holds only if the subsidy to the population is at its optimal level. If the subsidy is less than optimal, it will cause a reduction in A and thus reduce the effect of insufficient amounts of public goods. It turns out that in this case everybody will be at a lower utility level than the optimum; however, parameters characterizing the economy need not necessarily be biased, and if they are biased it cannot be predicted in which direction.
If households are subsidized above the optimal level, the bias of insufficient provision of DPG is strengthened. If public goods are provided above their optimal level, and assuming that the households are subsidized optimally, substi-tution effects will tend to decrease regeneration and consumption of other goods. Total income for all consumption goods except regeneration decreases due to lump sum taxes needed to finance the DPG. This reduces the consumption of x even further, but tends to increase A, thus countering the initial substitution effect. Again we do not know what the end result will be, i.e., Ae could be equal, smaller, or larger than Ao.
If we do not subsidize the household sector, and assuming that the desirable public good is provided optimally, the rate of regeneration will be suboptimal, consumption of leisure and other goods will increase, rate of capital accumulation per capita will exceed the optimum as will the level of capital per capita. The wage rate will be higher than the optimum level and r(t), the market rate of return, will decrease. The rate of return of public investment, p(t), will be higher than its optimum level.
Sensitivity Analysis: Summary and Some Policy Implications
We have so far established that government policies with respect to the provision of UPG and DPG can be characterized by the level of taxes or subsidies on households, tu, and on industry, 7i. Each of these controls can have one of three basic positions: above, equal to, or below its optimal value. Table I summarizes the long run biases in the market rate of return under different values of the controls 7r and ,A. The biases of A (t) are the same as those of r(t) (see (18) ), while those of p(t) are opposite (see (20) ). The biases of w(t), the wage rate, and r(t), leisure, have no such simple relationship to r(t) but since they can be determined in only a very few cases we do not deal with them in this section. Table I shows that in the case of UPG we have more information about the direction of the biases than in the case of DPG. It can also be seen from Table I that in both UPG and DPG the biases go in both directions. If we are in reality dealing with more than one public good, and assuming that we are not providing the optimal level of more than one of them, how do the biases aggregate? Let us assume that we are concerned only with marginal deviations from the optimum level of public goods. In this case deviation from the optimal level of one good is insufficient to change the conditional optimal level of the other good. 9 We already know that the biases can be described as a combination of two effects: biases due to a nonoptimal level of the public good provided and biases due to a nonoptimal behavior of households. In the production sector we have a one to one correspondence between the level of the public good produced and the amount of payments (taxes or subsidies) paid to or by industry.
The rule for aggregation of the biases is the following: if the absolute value of total payments needed to induce industry to produce given levels of a set of public goods is higher than the payments needed to induce production of the optimal levels of the same set of public goods, then the net aggregate bias of the production sector is read from Table I, If the absolute value of the total payments is less than the absolute value of the optimal payments, then the aggregate bias is read from row 1 (tie <I7o); if the total payments are equal (71e = 71o) then the bias is read from row 2 of Table I , either in the UPG part if total payments are negative or in the DPG part if total payments are positive. As proof of this conclusion, one should note that at the optimum, the per unit payment to industry (for producing good Pi) qo, is equal to the marginal contribution of that unit of pi to the utility level of the households (-NZp,/Z1) (see equation (34)) where pi is public good i and Z,, is aZiapi. If Api is the (marginal) amount of deviation from the optimum level of pi, the value of this deviation to the producer is rjjApi and the value to the household -Api(Zp,/ZD). This implies that two marginal deviations of two different public goods of the same value are perfect substitutes in the sense that the household is indifferent between the two types of deviations from the optimum.10 This implies a stronger result; the effects of these deviations can accumulate or cancel each other, depending on their respective signs. That is, the household will compensate with other goods (market goods x, leisure r, regeneration A) for the net aggregate value independently of the actual composition of the aggregate deviation. This implies that the net aggregate value of the deviations determines the amount of regeneration used by the household for compensation. Since A, the rate of regeneration, is the only determining factor of the long run bias in r(t) and p(t) (see (18) ), the stated conclusions follow.
It should be noted, however, that results based on the assumption of marginal deviations from the optimum may be of limited use in practice, because the deviations may be larger than marginal. Without this assumption, the results hold only if we assume a separable utility function.
When considering biases caused by nonoptimal behavior of households, no problems are encountered. Since these biases are determined by taxes and/or subsidies on household size, and since these taxes/subsidies can be added and/or subtracted, the direction of the biases can be read directly from Table I, where ?1e and 7no are the optimal and actual aggregate net tax/subsidy per unit household, respectively. The total aggregate optimal payment to industry is positive when total aggregate payments to the household are positive and vice versa.
From observable data one can estimate the observed rate of return. There is no readily available data which will yield information about the unbiased, true rate of return. We have already noted that knowing the optimum level of public goods is, to some extent, equivalent to knowing what the optimal Pigouvian taxes (subsidies) to industry are. In addition, we have already noted that estimation of biases can be made if we know what the optimal taxes/subsidies to industry and to households are, and what the actual transfers to or from those sectors are. At present, the magnitude of the optimal transfers, as Baumol in the case of UPG and Samuelson in the case of DPG, noted, are practically impossible to determine, which implies that the biases are currently immeasurable. However, we need not end this paper with such a discouraging conclusion. Recently Groves and Ledyard [6] , followed by Tideman and Tullock [19] introduced a new method for estimating the demand for a DPG. Methods for estimating the undesirability of a UPG have been known for quite some time (see, for example, Ridker and Henning [18] and for a more updated approach, Hochman and Miller [11] ). These new findings bring the estimation of the optimal level of a particular public good closer to reality. Thus, we may hope that in the near future we will be able to estimate the optimal Pigouvian and household taxes and through them estimate the contribution of the biases of the particular public goods. Obviously, considerable work is still needed before this aim is achieved.
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